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I. INTRODUCTION 
The interpretation of insurance contracts has been a 
tumultuous legal issue in recent decades.  Courts have long 
accepted and applied the doctrine of contra proferentem, requiring 
any ambiguity in a contract to be construed against the drafter, 
especially where insurance policies are concerned.1  However, an 
influential law review article argued in 1970 that contra proferentem 
had not been enough for courts seeking to protect insureds: they 
had gone beyond simply construing ambiguities and had taken to 
creating ambiguities where none existed.2  It was proposed that 
courts adopt a new approach to policy interpretation that would 
render such maneuvering unnecessary: the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, which effectuates the reasonable expectations of the 
insured even in the face of unambiguous policy language.3
Minnesota joined many states in taking that advice and put its 
proposition into practice, incorporating the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations into the state’s common law in 1985.
 
4
 
 1. Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729, 735 (2000) (noting that 
contra proferentem is a “widely recognized rule of contract interpretation”). 
  Almost 
immediately, though, the doctrine as formulated fell out of favor, 
 2. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 970–72 (1970) (arguing that contra proferentem is “an inadequate 
explanation of the results of some cases” because it has been applied to 
unambiguous contracts). 
 3. See id. at 973. 
 4. Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 
(Minn. 1985) (holding that, although business’ insurance policy expressly 
required a burglary to be “evidenced by visible marks,” the policy nonetheless 
included a burglary not evidenced by visible markings because the business 
reasonably expected such a loss to be included in the policy). 
2
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replaced by rules resembling contra proferentem in some cases, and a 
hybrid contra proferentem/reasonable expectations rule in others.  It 
remained unclear for over two decades when, if ever, the original 
formulation of the doctrine was to be applied.5
Carlson v. Allstate Insurance Co. is the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s latest attempt to resolve that confusion.
 
6  The court 
affirmed a summary judgment ruling in favor of an insurer, and 
held that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is to be used to 
reject unambiguous policy language only when there is a “hidden” 
exclusion; otherwise, ambiguity is required for the doctrine’s 
application.7  Even after Carlson, though, questions remain as to 
whether the doctrine is the exclusive method of interpreting 
ambiguity and, if so, how it is to be applied.8
This note begins by exploring the history of insurance contract 
interpretation in Minnesota, from contra proferentem to the different 
manifestations of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
 
9  It then 
examines the supreme court’s Carlson decision10 and analyzes the 
impact of the case on this body of law.11  It concludes that, although 
Carlson resolved the issue of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations vis à vis unambiguous policy language, it did little to 
clear the general confusion that continues to surround the 
interpretation of ambiguous language.12
II. HISTORY 
 
A. The Interpretation of Insurance Contracts in Minnesota Prior to 1985 
1. Early Decisions Embrace Contra Proferentem 
Minnesota courts noted long ago that “it is of paramount 
public policy not lightly to interfere with freedom of contract.”13
 
 5. See infra Part II.A.2. 
  
Notwithstanding that sentiment, those courts also decided long ago 
to treat insurance contracts as a prominent exception.  By the late 
 6. 749 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2008). 
 7. See id. at 49. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See infra Parts IV; V. 
 13. Nat’l Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45 Minn. 272, 276, 47 N.W. 806, 807 
(1891). 
3
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nineteenth century, the Minnesota Supreme Court had declared a 
bias against insurers in the realm of contract interpretation, 
adopting the doctrine of contra proferentem, a rule of construction 
that requires contract ambiguity to be construed against the 
drafter.14
That doctrine, the court remarked in 1874, “is more applicable 
to the conditions and provisos of policies of insurance than to 
almost any other instruments.”
   
15  The court reasoned that, because 
an insurance company has sole control over the preparation and 
wording of its policies, those policies “should be drafted with the 
most scrupulous exactness . . . [and] be absolutely free from 
ambiguity.”16  If ambiguity existed in an insurance policy after it left 
the company’s hands, then the company could not legitimately 
complain of ill treatment when the policy’s terms were resolved in 
favor of the insured.17
At times, however, the court’s bias against insurers was not 
limited to construing policy ambiguity against them, but exhibited 
creativity in finding policy ambiguity where none was immediately 
apparent.  An early example came in Price v. Phoenix Mutual Life 
Insurance Co.
 
18  In that case, the questionnaire for a life insurance 
policy asked applicants to disclose whether they had certain 
diseases, one of which was rheumatism.19  One insured answered 
the question in the negative even though he suffered from sub-
acute rheumatism.20  When his affliction was discovered, the insurer 
denied him coverage.21
The supreme court held that the insured should be covered by 
the policy, reasoning that the questionnaire was ambiguous as to 
whether the disease of rheumatism specifically encompassed sub-
acute rheumatism; the ambiguity was then construed against the 
insurer and coverage was ordered.
   
22
 
 14. See 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 1999) 
(“[Contra proferentem] is a generally accepted principle that any ambiguity in 
[contract] language will be interpreted against the drafter.”). 
  The court’s finding of 
ambiguity, perhaps questionable on its own, was made more so by 
 15. Chandler v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, 87 (1874). 
 16. Id. at 88. 
 17. Id. at 87–88. 
 18. 17 Minn. 497 (1871), rev’d on other grounds, Chambers v. Northwestern 
Mut.      Life Ins. Co., 64 Minn. 495, 67 N.W. 367 (1896). 
 19. Id. at 502. 
 20. Id. at 508. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 518. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/10
11. Cody.docx 12/2/2009  4:43 PM 
270 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
the analogy upon which the majority supported its decision: to say 
that the disease of “rheumatism” necessarily included the insured’s 
condition would be equivalent to saying that a person who bit her 
tongue would be required to report that she had the disease of 
“spitting of blood.” 23
2. Mid-twentieth Century Decisions Exhibit Confusion in the 
Application of Contra Proferentem 
 
Into the mid-twentieth century, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
stopped using the term contra proferentem but continued to endorse 
the doctrine’s thrust, that ambiguous policy language is to be 
construed against the insurer.24  At the same time, the court at least 
nominally purported to temper any zeal toward finding ambiguity, 
holding just as consistently that ambiguity is not to be read into an 
insurance contract, and that unambiguous policy language is to be 
read according to its plain language so as to effectuate the 
intentions of the parties.25
a. Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich 
  The rulings of the court, however, were 
not as consistent in applying that principle on a case-by-case basis.  
A survey of decisions from the 1950s and 1960s shows that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld freedom of contract principles 
in some cases, but strove to create ambiguity in others, with no 
discernible pattern.  Six cases are described below to exemplify the 
confusion.   
Even in the face of policy language that is plausibly ambiguous, 
the court has sometimes refused to construe it in the insured’s 
favor if the language’s intention is clear, although contra proferentem 
does not allow this.  For example, in Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 
two adult brothers lived in the same house with their parents.26
 
 23. Id.  
  
The older brother, the defendant in the case, was driving his car 
 24. See, e.g., Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960) 
(“Inasmuch as the language of an insurance policy is that of the insurer, any 
reasonable doubt as to its meaning must be resolved in favor of the insured.”). 
 25. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he court has no right to read an ambiguity into plain 
language of an insurance policy in order to construe it against the one who 
prepared the contract.”); Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 253, 58 
N.W.2d 855, 857 (1953) (explaining that, in the absence of ambiguity, terms in an 
insurance contract are to be understood in their plain and ordinary sense). 
 26. 239 Minn. at 252, 58 N.W.2d at 856–57. 
5
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with the younger brother, the plaintiff, as a passenger, when there 
was an accident and the plaintiff was injured.27  The defendant’s 
insurer refused to pay the plaintiff’s award because the defendant’s 
automobile insurance policy excluded coverage for “any member of 
the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.”28
The plaintiff argued that the policy exclusion was ambiguous 
and offered several possible constructions: for example, “family of 
the insured” might refer to the family of which the insured is the 
head;
 
29 or, “family of the insured” could refer solely to the 
insured’s spouse and children.30  The court was not persuaded, 
noting that the exclusion was obviously intended to “exempt the 
insurer from liability to one who would naturally and inevitably be 
partial to another because of the close filial ties which exist 
between members of the same family circle living in the same 
household.”31
b. Bolduc v. New York Fire Insurance Co. 
 
As compared to Tomlyanovich, a strong argument exists that the 
intentions of the parties were not given effect in Bolduc v. New York 
Fire Insurance Co.32  In that case, a construction company was 
building a bridge over water, and its equipment was covered against 
collision damage that occurred when the equipment was “moving 
under its own power.”33  The company’s pile driver was placed on 
some pilings in the water, and connected by cable to more pilings 
on the shore so that it could pull them into the water as needed.34  
An accident occurred during the construction; instead of the pile 
driver pulling the pilings from the shore as intended, the pilings on 
the shore became stuck and the cable pulled the pile driver itself 
into the water.35  The insurer denied coverage, arguing that the pile 
driver was not “moving under its own power” and that, in any 
event, no “collision” occurred when it fell into the water.36
The court held for the plaintiff construction company, 
   
 
 27. Id. at 250–51, 58 N.W.2d at 856. 
 28. Id. at 252, 58 N.W.2d at 856. 
 29. Id. at 256, 58 N.W.2d at 859. 
 30. Id. at 260, 58 N.W.2d at 861. 
 31. Id. at 265, 58 N.W.2d at 864. 
 32. 244 Minn. 192, 69 N.W.2d 660 (1955). 
 33. Id. at 195–96, 69 N.W.2d at 663. 
 34. Id. at 195, 69 N.W.2d at 663. 
 35. Id. at 196, 69 N.W.2d at 664. 
 36. Id. at 196–97, 69 N.W.2d at 664–65. 
6
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reasoning that when words in insurance contracts are even 
remotely ambiguous, they are to be construed liberally, even if 
contrary to their literal meanings, to provide coverage.37  The term 
“moving under its own power” was therefore held to be ambiguous, 
and the court gave effect to the insured’s interpretation that the 
term included the situation where a jammed piling caused the pile 
driver to pull itself down.38  “Collision,” to the contrary, was held to 
be unambiguous, but in a non-obvious way.  According to the 
court, it was “well established” that when an object fell into water 
there was a “collision” within the meaning of an insurance policy.39
c. Quaderer v. Integrity Mutual Insurance Co. 
 
Next, in Quaderer v. Integrity Mutual Insurance Co., the court 
confronted an automobile insurance policy.40  The plaintiff in that 
case purchased a policy covering his two vehicles, one of which was 
used by his son.41  Later on, the plaintiff’s son acquired his own 
automobile. A week after that, the son was involved in an accident 
while driving his new car.42  The plaintiff’s insurer refused to 
undertake the son’s defense on the ground that the policy covered 
only those vehicles owned by the plaintiff.43
The court took a broad view of the policy terms “ownership” 
and “owned automobile,” finding them ambiguous.
   
44  According to 
the court, “[t]he apparent purpose . . . of this policy was to insure 
plaintiff against all risks. . . . Thus the terms, as used in the 
provisions in question, were intended to have a broader meaning 
than legal title.”45  The owner of an automobile, as the policy was 
interpreted, was not only the “registered owner, or one having legal 
title to the vehicle,” but also “simply one who may be exposed to 
liability as a registered owner pursuant to statutes governing motor 
vehicle registration.”46
 
 37. Id. at 198, 69 N.W.2d at 665. 
  Hypothetically, the plaintiff could have 
 38. Id. at 200, 69 N.W.2d at 666. 
 39. Id. at 198–99, 69 N.W.2d at 665. 
 40. 263 Minn. 383, 116 N.W.2d 605 (1962). 
 41. Id. at 384, 116 N.W.2d at 606. 
 42. Id. at 385, 116 N.W.2d at 606.  Although the plaintiff did not immediately 
notify his insurer of the new vehicle, the policy allowed him thirty days from the 
time of acquisition to do so.  Id. at 385-87, 116 N.W.2d at 607–08.   
 43. Id. at 385-86, 116 N.W.2d at 606–07. 
 44. Id. at 388, 116 N.W.2d at 608. 
 45. Id. at 388, 116 N.W.2d at 608–09. 
 46. See id. at 388, 116 N.W.2d at 608.  According to the court, “a finding by 
the jury that plaintiff was the owner for the purposes of the Safety Responsibility 
7
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been held vicariously liable when his son was in an accident with his 
own vehicle; thus, the plaintiff possessed an “insurable interest in 
the automobile” and an ownership interest.47  As the court 
concluded: “[a]lthough we believe the [trial] court was correct in 
finding that [the plaintiff’s son] owned the [automobile], this 
finding cannot be taken to mean that he was the sole owner.”48
d. Holtz v. Mutual Service Casualty Co. 
 
The court was less favorable to the insured in Holtz v. Mutual 
Service Casualty Co.49  The plaintiff and his wife were covered under 
the same automobile policy, and his wife was injured when another 
driver struck her car.50  She was awarded $48,400 in damages for 
her injuries, and the plaintiff was awarded over $5800 for his wife’s 
medical expenses; however, the insurer refused to pay the plaintiff 
any more than $1600 because the policy set the insurer’s limit of 
liability at $50,000 “for all damages . . . arising out of bodily 
injury . . . sustained by one person in any one accident.”51
The parties disputed the meaning of that policy language.
   
52  
The insurance company argued that $50,000 was the limit of its 
liability for “bodily injury . . . sustained by one person.”53  Therefore, 
because both the plaintiff’s award and his wife’s arose from the 
same bodily injury, there was no duty to pay their combined awards 
beyond the $50,000 limit.54  The plaintiff countered that the policy 
should read “damages . . . sustained by one person.”55  Thus, insofar 
as his wife’s medical expenses were separate damages than those he 
suffered himself, he was entitled to full payment.56  The court cited 
the proposition from Quaderer that ambiguities are to be construed 
against the drafter of an insurance policy;57
 
Act would not have been unlikely, even though the trial court reached a contrary 
finding under the evidence before us.”  Id. at 389, 116 N.W.2d at 609. 
 however, despite the 
plaintiff’s suggestion of a plausible construction, the court held 
 47. See id. at 389, 116 N.W.2d at 609.   
 48. Id. 
 49. 264 Minn. 121, 117 N.W.2d 767 (1962). 
 50. Id. at 121, 117 N.W.2d at 768. 
 51. Id. at 121-23, 117 N.W.2d at 768–69. 
 52. Id. at 121–22, 117 N.W.2d at 768.  
 53. Id. at 123, 117 N.W.2d at 769 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Quaderer v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Minn. 383, 388–89, 116 N.W.2d 
605, 608 (1962).  
8
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that there was no ambiguity.58  The policy “clearly” indicated that 
$50,000 would be the insurer’s limit of liability for all damages 
sustained by virtue of a bodily injury.59
e. Struble v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. of California 
 
In Struble v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. of California, the 
plaintiff suffered from severe depression and was unable to 
maintain employment.60  His disability insurance policy provided 
him with benefits if his illness rendered him “necessarily and 
continuously confined within the house and therein regularly visited 
and attended by a legally qualified physician or surgeon other than 
himself.”61  However, the plaintiff’s psychiatrist recommended that 
he work outdoors as much as possible, whether repairing his house 
or as a laborer.62  If the policy language was taken as mandatory, it 
would contradict the advice of the plaintiff’s physician and possibly 
worsen his condition.63
The court noted that the likely purpose of the “regularly 
visited and attended” language was to prevent fraud or 
malingering; the evidence disallowed the possibility that such was 
the case with the plaintiff.
 
64  Therefore, reasoning that the parties 
must have contemplated that the insured would follow his 
physician’s advice, the court concluded that the policy language 
was ambiguous and construed it in the insured’s favor, granting 
coverage.65
The dissent found the holding incompatible with the policy’s 
terms, but also pointed out an interesting fact: the plaintiff often 
left his home both for work and recreation.
   
66
 
 58. Holtz, 264 Minn. at 126, 117 N.W.2d at 770. 
  By focusing on the 
evidence that the plaintiff was not a malingerer, the majority 
essentially ignored the policy’s plain “necessarily and continuously 
confined language” and, in doing so, “eliminate[d] as practically 
 59. Id.  The court relied heavily upon similar decisions in other jurisdictions 
considering similar policy language.  Id. at 124–25, 117 N.W.2d at 769–70. 
 60. 265 Minn. 26, 28-31, 120 N.W.2d 609, 612–13 (1963).   
 61. Id. at 27, 120 N.W.2d at 611 (emphasis added).  The plaintiff had already 
exhausted twenty-four months of coverage provided by the policy for total 
disability that did not necessitate confinement to his home. Id. at 29, 120 N.W.2d 
at 612. 
 62. Id. at 30, 120 N.W.2d at 613. 
 63. Id. at 32, 120 N.W.2d at 613–14. 
 64. Id. at 37, 120 N.W.2d at 616–17. 
 65. Id. at 38, 120 N.W.2d at 617. 
 66. Id. at 39, 120 N.W.2d at 618 (Otis, J., dissenting). 
9
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meaningless a substantial provision in the contract of the parties.”67
f. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Eagles 
Lodge 
 
In Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Eagles Lodge, the 
defendant held an automobile race at a county fairground.68  Deo 
Waldron, the local chief of police, was there in his official capacity, 
without the request of the organizers, to patrol the racetrack and 
keep spectators off of it.69  During one of the races, there was a 
pileup.70  Waldron attempted to prevent spectators and additional 
vehicles from entering the track, but another accident occurred 
and a car struck Waldron, killing him.71
The city’s worker’s compensation insurer won a default 
judgment against the defendant and attempted to recover from the 
defendant’s insurer, Continental.
 
72  Continental denied on the 
ground that the policy it issued to the defendant excluded coverage 
for injury to “policemen . . . employed on or about the premises” of 
the racetrack.73  The plaintiff argued that “policemen” must be 
construed to include only those officers associated with or 
employed by the defendant; otherwise even an off-duty officer who 
was enjoying a race would be excluded from the policy’s coverage.74
The supreme court took a strong position against the plaintiff, 
explaining that, even with an insurance contract, “parties are free 
to contract as they see fit and that the language of the contract is to 
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”
 
75  Because Waldron was 
undisputedly a policeman, there could be no argument that the 
contract’s plain terms excluded him from coverage.  The court 
would not go so far as to say that even an off-duty officer would be 
excluded; such a construction would absolve the insurer of all 
liability.76
 
 67. Id. 
  At the same time, though, it would not construe the 
policy “so strictly against the insurer as to create a new contract 
 68. 282 Minn. 477, 478, 165 N.W.2d 554, 555 (1969). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 479, 165 N.W.2d at 556. 
 73. Id. at 478–79, 165 N.W.2d at 556. 
 74. Id. at 479, 165 N.W.2d at 556. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. 
10
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imposing additional liability on it.”77
B. The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations 
 
1. Keeton Formulates the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations 
If the Minnesota Supreme Court seemed willing at times to 
stretch to find ambiguity in insurance contracts and apply contra 
proferentem, it was not alone.  In a seminal 1970 article, Robert E. 
Keeton noted that, over time, many courts had apparently become 
willing to reach in order to declare policy terms ambiguous, and 
were sometimes even open to inventing ambiguity when it could 
not be found.78  They would then construe the purported 
ambiguities against the insurance companies.79  No existing 
doctrine, such as contra proferentem, could adequately explain the 
rationale behind those decisions, leading Keeton to suggest that a 
new, but unnamed and implicit, doctrine had arisen, one that came 
to be known as the doctrine of reasonable expectations: “The 
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended 
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be 
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions 
would have negated those expectations.”80
Keeton proposed that, in reality, courts were giving effect to 
policyholders’ reasonable expectations, regardless of their policies’ 
actual language.
 
81  However, they were also creating confusion by 
cloaking their decisions in the guise of contra proferentem.82  To avoid 
that confusion and promote certainty, Keeton advocated that 
“insurance law ought to embrace”83
 
 77. Id. 
 the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, allowing courts to construe insurance policies against 
 78. Keeton, supra note 2, at 972 (“The conclusion is inescapable that courts 
have sometimes invented ambiguity where none existed, then resolving [sic] the 
invented ambiguity contrary to the plainly expressed terms of the contract 
document.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 967. 
 81. See id.  Keeton used the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Struble, see 
supra Part II.A.2.e, as one example of decisions “where courts have disallowed 
literal enforcement of policy provisions without regard to whether the individual 
policyholder read or had ample opportunity to read the restrictive provision in 
question.” See id. at 975, n.24. 
 82. See id. at 970. 
 83. Id. at 967. 
11
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insurers even in the face of unambiguous policy language.84  The 
doctrine was attractive because of the disparity in bargaining power 
between insurer and insured,85 the adhesive nature of insurance 
contracts,86 and the average layperson’s inability to read or 
comprehend complex policy language.87  Courts throughout the 
United States followed Keeton’s lead and began to adopt the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations in one form or another during 
the 1970s and 1980s.88
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not immediately espouse 
Keeton’s position, but began to tend in the direction of 
reasonableness in Canadian Universal Insurance v. Fire Watch.
   
89  Fire 
Watch installed an automatic fire extinguisher system in a 
restaurant; however, the system malfunctioned during a fire, 
causing the restaurant to be largely consumed by flames.90
 
 84. Id. at 972.  
  Prior to 
the fire, Fire Watch’s insurance policy was amended by an 
endorsement from its insurer.  The original policy would have 
provided coverage for damage arising from negligent installation of 
the extinguisher system; the endorsement unambiguously excluded 
(To extend the principle of resolving ambiguities against the draftsman 
in this fictional way not only causes confusion and uncertainty about the 
effective scope of judicial regulation of contract terms but also creates an 
impression of unprincipled judicial prejudice against insurers. If results 
in such cases are supportable at all, generally it is because the principle 
of honoring policyholders’ reasonable expectations applies.). 
 85. See James F. Hogg, The Tale of a Tail, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515, 568 
(1998). 
 86. It was pointed out that the adhesive effect of insurance contracts is often 
compounded by the fact that some consumers, such as drivers and home owners, 
have no choice but to purchase insurance.  See Eugene R. Anderson & James J. 
Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations 
of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 368 (1992). 
 87. See Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1476–80 (1989). 
 88. See, e.g., Estrin Const. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 418 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting “strong” version of the doctrine, looking for the 
insured’s reasonable expectations even when a policy is unambiguous); Hallowell 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 927 (Del. 1982) (adopting “weak” 
version of the doctrine, honoring the insured’s reasonable expectations in 
situations of ambiguity and when important terms are hidden in fine print); see 
also Laurie Kindel Fett, Note, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative to 
Bending and Stretching Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1113, 1123 n.64 (1992) (categorizing the positions of states adopting the 
doctrine). But see Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979) 
(rejecting the doctrine of reasonable expectations in any form).   
 89. 258 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1977). 
 90. Id. at 571. 
12
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such coverage.91  When it received the endorsement, Fire Watch 
expressed confusion to its insurer as to the effect on its coverage, 
but received no response or explanation.92
Although the endorsement’s exclusionary language was 
unambiguous, the court refused to enforce it, noting that “[t]he 
terms of an insurance policy should be construed according to 
what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have 
understood the words to mean.”
 
93  To that end, the court 
invalidated the terms of the endorsement, adopting the rule that, 
when an endorsement “substantially reduces the prior insurance 
coverage,” written notice to the insured is required for the 
reduction to be effective.94
2. Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual 
Insurance Co. 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court formally adopted the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations in 1985 in Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western 
National Mutual Insurance Co.95  The plaintiff in Atwater obtained 
burglary insurance, but was unaware that the policy’s definition of 
burglary required visible marks of forced entry in order for 
coverage to exist.96
 
 91. Id. at 574 (“[W]e conclude that under the policy as originally issued, Fire 
Watch was afforded coverage for losses arising from negligent installation of the 
extinguisher system and that the endorsement removed this protection . . . .”). 
  When a burglary occurred without any such 
 92. See id. at 573.  The court also noted that Fire Watch’s premium was not 
reduced following the endorsement, likely adding to its confusion over the 
meaning of the new language.  See id. at 574. 
 93. See id. at 572 (emphasis added).  The court would not be willing to 
automatically accept an insured’s reading as reasonable, though.  For example, in 
Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lill, 332 N.W.2d 635, 637–38 (Minn. 1983), the 
insured’s policy included a confusingly arranged table of coverage that led the 
insured to mistakenly conclude that farm employees were covered.  The court 
held for the insurer, explaining that the insured should have read the policy more 
carefully, after which it would have realized that it did not provide coverage for 
farm employees.   
 94. Fire Watch, 258 N.W.2d at 575. 
 95. 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985).  Although the Atwater court described the 
Fire Watch holding as an application of “reasonable-expectations-of-the-insured 
analysis,” id. at 278, Atwater’s holding is widely recognized as introducing the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations to Minnesota law.  See John M. Bjorkman, The 
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Overview, 29 A.B.A. THE BRIEF 38, 40 (2000); 
Fett, supra note 88, at 1124–25; Hogg, supra note 85, at 567; Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the 
Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 196–97 (1998). 
 96. 366 N.W.2d at 275.  Another provision of the policy indicated that 
13
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marks, the plaintiff filed a claim; however, its insurer, Western 
National, denied coverage.97
The policy’s language was undoubtedly unambiguous, 
rendering contra proferentem inapplicable to allow the court to find 
coverage.
 
98
The doctrine of protecting the reasonable expectations of 
the insured is closely related to the doctrine of contracts 
of adhesion. Where there is unequal bargaining power 
between the parties so that one party controls all of the 
terms and offers the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
the contract will be strictly construed against the party 
who drafted it. Most courts recognize the great disparity in 
  However, the absence of ambiguity did not preclude a 
finding for the plaintiff; as Justice Wahl explained for the court, in 
certain circumstances an unambiguous policy could still be 
construed in the insured’s favor to protect the insured’s reasonable 
expectations: 
 
“[t]erms of this policy which are in conflict with the statutes of the State wherein 
this policy is issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes.”  Id.  Atwater 
argued that this language required the court to substitute the policy’s definition of 
burglary with the statutory definition, which did not require visible marks of 
forced entry.  Id.  The court disagreed, noting that “[a]n insurer may limit the 
risks against which it is willing to indemnify the insured. . . . [T]here is no conflict 
between the two [definitions] given their disparate functions.”  Id.  Importantly, 
though, the court also remarked that the difference between the policy and 
statutory definitions of burglary “has a bearing on the insured’s reasonable 
expectations in purchasing burglary insurance.”  Id. 
 97. There was no sign of forced entry on any of the exterior entrances to 
Atwater’s building.  Id. at 274.  Although the padlocks of the interior storage bins 
were missing, there were no visible signs that they had been forced off.  See id.  
 98. The policy’s definition of burglary was, in fact, quite common, and 
though unambiguous, the court noted that the language had often been 
circumvented to find coverage in other jurisdictions.  Id. at 275–76.  The court 
described three methods by which that had been accomplished.  Id. at 276.  First, 
other courts held the language to be ambiguous despite its clear language, and 
then interpreted it in favor of the insured.  Id.  This technique was perfunctorily 
rejected.  Id. 
Second, other courts looked to the purpose of the policy language: to protect 
insurers from “inside jobs” and to encourage insureds to secure their premises.  
Id.  In a case like Atwater, where evidence showed that the burglary was not an 
inside job and that the insureds’ premises were indeed secure, those courts would 
find coverage, reasoning that to do so would not offend the purpose of the policy 
exclusion.  Id.  The court again rejected the technique, explaining that it was 
“uncomfortable . . . with this analysis given the right of an insurer to limit the risk 
against which it will indemnify insureds.”  Id. 
Finally, other courts had chosen to treat the policy language as creating an 
evidentiary standard, and gone on to ignore the language when other evidence 
showed that a burglary had occurred.  Id.  The Atwater court again refused to treat 
the exclusion as anything other than what it unambiguously was.  See id. 
14
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bargaining power between insurance companies and 
those who seek insurance. Further, they recognize that, in 
the majority of cases, a lay person lacks the necessary skills 
to read and understand insurance policies, which are 
typically long, set out in very small type and written from a 
legalistic or insurance expert’s perspective. Finally, courts 
recognize that people purchase insurance relying on 
others, the agent or company, to provide a policy that 
meets their needs.99
Justice Wahl employed Keeton’s reasoning, pointing out that 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations would allow the court to 
interpret the insurance policy in favor of finding coverage “without 
having to rely on arbitrary rules which do not reflect real-life 
situations and without having to bend and stretch those rules to do 
justice in individual cases.”
 
100  Although the burglary exclusion 
plainly required visible signs of forced entry, it had the effect of a 
hidden exclusion that “defeat[ed] the reasonable expectations of 
the purchaser of the policy” that coverage would be provided 
whether a “break-in [was] accomplished by an inept burglar or by a 
highly skilled burglar.”101
Along with Keeton’s reasoning, Justice Wahl’s opinion invoked 
Keeton’s own language: insureds would still be required to read the 
terms of their insurance policies,
 
102 but their reasonable 
expectations would “be honored even though painstaking study of 
the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”103  
Although ambiguity would no longer be required in practice to 
construe a policy in the insured’s favor, it would remain part of the 
analysis as “a factor in determining the reasonable expectations of 
the insured,” along with the obscurity of the challenged provision 
and the public’s general knowledge of the particular provision.104
 
 99. Id. at 277. 
  
The court’s holding adopted the “strong” version of the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations, allowing coverage to be found even 
 100. Id. at 278. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. at 277 (quoting Keeton, supra note 2, at 967). 
 104. See id. at 278.  Justice Simonett filed a special concurrence, in which three 
others joined, advocating adoption of the “weak” version of the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations, which would require policy ambiguity before the 
doctrine could be applied.  See infra note 105.  In Atwater, Justice Simonett found 
the policy’s definition of burglary to be ambiguous.  See id. at 279 (Simonett, J., 
concurring). 
15
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when policy language unambiguously excluded it.105
Identifying ambiguity as a factor in the reasonable 
expectations analysis had an interesting, but unnoted, 
consequence: a court could not consistently use both the new 
doctrine and contra proferentem.
   
106  The Atwater court noted that the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations did not guarantee pro-insured 
outcomes, but could also result in pro-insurer findings, based on 
the insured’s objectively reasonable expectations.107  Contra 
proferentem, of course, precludes a pro-insurer finding.  Accordingly, 
Atwater seemed to mark the end of contra proferentem.108
C. The Interpretation of Insurance Contracts in Minnesota After 1985 
 
1. Post-Atwater Decisions Exhibit Confusion in the Application of 
the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations 
Finally accepted in Minnesota, the doctrine of reasonable 
 
 105. See id. at 278–79; see also James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations is Indispensable, If We Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 155 
(1998).  The “weak” version of the doctrine requires ambiguity in the policy 
language.  Fischer, supra.  Once ambiguity is established, “[t]he policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations may be considered to determine which version of the 
ambiguous language should be adopted by the court.”  Fischer, supra. 
 106. See Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 642, 646 
(Minn. 1986) (Coyne, J., dissenting) (“[I]nherent in the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations is the rejection of the traditional rule that ambiguities are 
automatically construed most favorably to the insured. . . .”). 
 107. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (“In our view, the reasonable-expectations 
doctrine does not automatically mandate either pro-insurer or pro-insured results.  
It does place a burden on insurance companies to communicate coverage and 
exclusions of policies accurately and clearly.  It does require that expectations of 
coverage by the insured be reasonable under the circumstances.  Neither of those 
requirements seems overly burdensome.  Properly used, the doctrine will result in 
coverage in some cases and in no coverage in others.”). 
 108. Apart from the logical incompatibility of the two doctrines, the language 
of Atwater supports this conclusion.  The majority’s opinion remarked that the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations would require all insurance policies to be 
construed “without having to rely on arbitrary rules which do not reflect real-life 
situations and without having to bend and stretch those rules to do justice in 
individual cases.”  Id. at 278.  Those “arbitrary rules” were not identified, but it is 
likely that contra proferentem was included.  Keeton argued that some courts were 
willing to “strain the outer limits of the theory of resolving ambiguity” to find 
ambiguity. Keeton, supra note 2, at 970.  Others “have sometimes invented 
ambiguity where none existed.”  Keeton, supra note 2, at 972.  In other words, 
courts “stretch[ed]” to create opportunities to use contra proferentem in ways that 
“do not reflect real-life situations.”  Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278.  The Atwater 
majority relied heavily on Keeton’s reasoning, raising a strong probability that it 
was also referring to contra proferentem.  Id. 
16
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expectations fell immediately into disuse.  One year after Atwater, 
the court heard Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co.109  
The case involved a trucking company whose insurance policy was 
amended by two endorsements.110  The first endorsement limited 
uninsured motorist coverage to $25,000 for one person in one 
accident; the second set the limit of uninsured motorist coverage at 
the sum of the limits of each insured vehicle.111  One of the 
company’s employees was injured by an uninsured motorist; with 
sixty-seven insured vehicles, the company argued that its coverage 
limit should be determined by the second endorsement and set at 
$1,675,000.112
Because both endorsements could not consistently be given 
effect, the supreme court found that the policy was ambiguous.
   
113  
Instead of applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations, 
though, the court used contra proferentem to construe the policy 
against the insurer, explaining that “the policy is ambiguous and, 
therefore, is to be strictly interpreted against the insurer.”114  The 
court noted a proviso to its application of contra proferentem, though: 
“[t]he result . . . must not be beyond the reasonable expectations of 
the insured.”115  Equipped with that rule, the majority construed 
the ambiguity against the insurer and held that it was reasonable 
for the trucking company to expect a coverage limit of 
$1,675,000.116
The dissent was clear in its disapproval of that holding.  Justice 
Coyne wrote, “the conceded presence of an ambiguity in the . . . 
policy would seem to mandate application of the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations.
   
117
 
 109. 387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1986). 
  The majority’s decision, however, was 
incompatible with the doctrine.  The doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, as described in Atwater, did not require pro-insured 
results, and the trucking company could not reasonably have 
expected such a high coverage limit when its premiums reflected a 
 110. See id. at 644. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 643. 
 113. Id. at 644–45. 
 114. See id.  The court, in fact, referred to the rule as an “ancient principle.”  
See id. at 645. 
 115. Id. at 645 (citing Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 
N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985)). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 646 (Coyne, J., dissenting). 
17
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lower one.118
The rule adopted in Atwater . . . does not provide a way to 
validate a decision already made under the doctrine of 
[construing ambiguity strictly against the insurer]. The 
doctrine of reasonable expectations provides a method 
for resolving disagreements over contractual provisions on 
the basis of the parties’ reasonable expectations about 
their transaction. To put it another way, the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations contemplates the application of 
an objective standard based on what parties such as [the 
trucking company] and [its insurer] reasonably expected 
from their agreement when they made it, not on the 
subjective expectations formed by a truck driver after he 
has been injured in the course of his employment by one 
of the contracting parties.
  Justice Coyne argued that the majority, despite citing 
Atwater in its opinion, had in reality used that case’s language to 
justify a result that it had already reached by use of contra 
proferentem: 
119
In reaching its decision, according to the dissent, the Rusthoven 
majority had effectively “abandoned” the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations.
 
120
Following Rusthoven, the court’s application of Atwater’s 
reasonable expectations doctrine, or even Rusthoven’s contra 
proferentem/reasonable expectations hybrid rule, was as inconsistent 
as its application of contra proferentem had been prior to Atwater.  
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
 
121 
involved insurance policies under which the defendant insurers 
agreed “to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . 
property damage to which this insurance applies.”122  Each of the 
plaintiff corporations was found to have contaminated the soil and 
groundwater with chemical waste over a period of decades; by 
order of state and federal government regulatory agencies, each of 
the corporations proceeded to spend great sums of money 
investigating and cleaning the waste sites in return for release from 
statutory liability.123
 
 118. See id. 
  Each of the corporations then brought suit 
 119. Id. at 647. 
 120. Id. at 646. 
 121. 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990). 
 122. Id. at 177. 
 123. Id. 
18
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against its insurer seeking compensation for the cleanup costs.124
The insurance companies argued that “the term ‘damages’ 
should be interpreted in the insurance policies to contemplate 
amounts paid as monetary compensation for injuries to third 
parties, and should not cover amounts paid to comply with 
injunctive orders.”
 
125  The supreme court disagreed; finding 
“damages” to be ambiguous, it applied the Rusthoven rule: 
“[a]mbiguous terms in an insurance policy are to be resolved 
against the insurer and in accordance with the reasonable 
expectations of the insured.”126  The court then explained that the 
insured corporations “could reasonably expect the policy to 
provide coverage for any economic outlay compelled by law to 
rectify or mitigate damage caused by the insured’s acts or 
omissions.”127
The dissents disagreed that the policy language was ambiguous 
and argued that, even if it was, the insureds could not reasonably 
have expected coverage.
 
128  Justice Kelley wrote that, in the context 
of the policy, “[t]he plain meaning of the term as so employed 
refer[red] to legal damages, and not to equitable-like remediation 
damages.”129  Justice Coyne viewed the majority’s decision as 
“ignoring the plain, ordinary and traditionally accepted meaning of 
the term ‘damages’ as ‘only payments to third persons when those 
persons have a legal claim for damages. . . .’”130  As to the 
reasonableness of expecting coverage, Justice Kelley’s dissent 
pointed out that “the policies in question were negotiated between 
large corporations, each of which had access to sophisticated 
insurance and legal departments or advice.”131
 
 124. Id. 
  At the time of 
contract the risk of enormous liability for polluters “was neither 
 125. Id. at 178. 
 126. Id. at 179 (citation omitted). 
 127. Id. at 181-82 (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. 
Supp. 1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich. 1988)). 
 128. See id. at 185, 187 (Coyne, J. & Kelley, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 184 (Kelley, J., dissenting). 
 130. See id. at 186 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 
(5th Cir. 1955) (Coyne, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
majority’s stance on this issue was that “the legal proceedings commenced by [the 
regulatory agency] against the insureds [was] equally coercive as a civil judgment . 
. . .  The fact that the legal obligation is . . . mandated by [an administrative order] 
rather than a civil judgment does not change the nature of the obligation.”  Id. at 
183. 
 131. Id. at 185 (Kelley, J., dissenting). 
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contemplated nor was its assumption by the insurers bargained for 
when the premium was set.”132
[I]t is difficult to accept a claim by these sophisticated 
parties that they “reasonably expected” coverage and then 
delayed for a period from four to eight years in informing 
their insurers of either the ongoing investigations and 
negotiations with the state to remedy or eliminate any 
environmental harm occasioned by their activities or their 
unilateral compliance with governmental cleanup 
directives. As a practical matter, the actions of the 
insureds are wholly inconsistent with their claim that 
coverage was contemplated.
  Justice Coyne was more direct on 
the issue: 
133
In Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben,
 
134 when faced with 
no policy ambiguity, the court refused to apply the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations without making reference to Atwater.135  
The case involved defective potato seed; the seed sellers’ insurance 
policy excluded coverage for “[f]ailure of seed to conform to the 
variety or quality specified.”136  When some potato seed was found 
to have ring rot, the plaintiffs argued that “quality specified” 
should be construed to refer to “a particular ‘grade’ of seed 
and . . . not [to] include seed which is contaminated by disease.”137  
The insurer refused to cover the damages, though, contending that 
the exclusion referred to all warranty claims, and that the seed 
simply “did not fulfill . . . [its] purpose or expectation.”138  Despite 
the apparent reasonableness of each interpretation, the court sided 
with the insurer and held that the policy unambiguously excluded 
coverage.139
The plaintiffs then argued that the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations should apply because the seed sellers specifically 
“requested coverage for diseased seed and were assured that this 
coverage was included.”
 
140
 
 132. Id. 
  Now echoing the dissent in Minnesota 
Mining & Manufacturing, but not referring to that case or 
explaining the distinction, the court rejected the reasonable 
 133. Id. at 187 (Coyne, J., dissenting). 
 134. 505 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. 1993). 
 135. See id. at 327. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. 
20
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expectations argument, pointing out that the seed sellers “were 
experienced business people.”141
2. The End of Atwater and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations 
in Minnesota? 
 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals also had difficulty with 
Atwater.  Where unambiguous policy language was concerned, 
uncertainty over the case’s precedential value led them to disregard 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations altogether142 except where 
a policy contained a hidden provision.143
One case dealing with such a “hidden provision” involved a 
contractor’s insurance policy that included a pollution exclusion.
   
144  
When insulation installed by the contractor deteriorated and 
emitted noxious levels of formaldehyde, injuring a home’s 
occupants, the contractor’s insurer claimed that the damage fell 
within the policy’s exclusion.145  Explaining that the purpose of the 
exclusion was “to deny coverage . . . to those who knew or should 
have known their actions would cause harm,”146 the court described 
the dispute as “the unusual case requiring application of Atwater 
. . . . [The contractor] purchased insurance to protect himself from 
damage resulting from the installation of insulation. Under the 
broad coverage afforded, he would reasonably expect coverage.”147
That decision, the unusual case requiring application of 
Atwater, was overruled by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Board of 
Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Royal Insurance Co. of 
America.
 
148
 
 141. Id. 
  Faced with a similar pollution exclusion provision, the 
 142. See, e.g., Merseth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 390 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986) (“In light of this uncertainty, we decline to apply the reasonable-
expectations-regardless-of-ambiguity doctrine beyond the facts of Atwater.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Sonneman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 403 N.W.2d 701, 
708 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“The reasonable expectations doctrine does not apply 
since the policy here does not contain a ‘hidden exclusion’ in the definitions 
section . . . .”); Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987) (“Subsequent decisions by this court, however, have limited the reasonable 
expectations doctrine to cases involving contracts with hidden exclusions.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 144. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1988), overruled by Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of 
Am., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994). 
 145. Id. at 497. 
 146. Id. at 498. 
 147. Id. at 499 (emphasis added). 
 148. 517 N.W.2d 888. 
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court had to decide whether or not liability for asbestos claims 
would be covered.149  Characterizing Atwater as a “unique 
situation”150 in which the doctrine of reasonable expectations was 
limited to “exclusions hidden in the definitions section,”151
The reasonable expectations test of Atwater . . . has no 
place here, and the contrary ruling of Grinnell is overruled 
. . . . [I]n this case, the pollution exclusion is plainly 
designated as such; consequently, the wording of the 
exclusion should be construed, if a claim of ambiguity is 
raised, in accordance with the usual rules of 
interpretation governing insurance contracts.  The 
reasonable expectation test is not a license to ignore the 
pollution exclusion in this case nor to rewrite the 
exclusion solely to conform to a result that the insured 
might prefer.
 the 
court stated: 
152
As for “the usual rules of interpretation governing insurance 
contracts,”
 
153 the court did not specify whether it was referring to 
contra proferentem or Rusthoven’s hybrid rule.154
 
 149. The policy excluded coverage for:  
  Following Board of 
Regents, the interpretation of insurance contracts in Minnesota 
remained in that state of uncertainty for over a decade, and it was 
[B]odily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
toxic chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials or other irritants, 
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere, or any 
water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. 
Id. at 890. 
 150. Id. at 891 n.4. 
 151. See id. at 891 (“In Atwater, we held that ‘where major exclusions are 
hidden in the definitions section, the insured should be held only to reasonable 
knowledge of the literal terms and conditions.’” (quoting Atwater Creamery Co. v. 
W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985))). 
 152. Id. at 891. 
 153. Id. 
 154. A later case underlined the confusion.  Stating the rule of insurance 
contract interpretation, a majority of the supreme court wrote that “[i]f [a policy] 
is ambiguous, it will be construed against the insurance company, as drafter of the 
contract.”  Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Widness ex rel. Widness, 635 N.W.2d 
516, 518 (Minn. 2001) (citing Current Tech. Concepts, Inc. v Irie Enters., Inc., 530 
N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 1995)).  The dissent characterized the rule as: 
“[a]mbiguous terms in an insurance policy are to be resolved against the insurer 
and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”  Id. at 524 
(Gilbert, J., dissenting) (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. 
Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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thus that the supreme court decided Carlson v. Allstate Insurance 
Co.155
III. THE CARLSON DECISION 
 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Robert Carlson leased a 2002 Ford Focus for his son, Aaron, to 
drive.156  Robert made all of the payments for the vehicle and 
obtained and paid for its insurance from Allstate.157  The policy 
listed Robert and his wife as “named insureds,” and Aaron as a 
“driver.”158  In 2003, Aaron parked the Focus and began to walk 
across a street; in the middle of the road he was struck by a car 
driven by an uninsured motorist.159  Aaron’s injuries required 
surgery and rendered him unable to work for several months.160  
He obtained a default judgment against the driver for $170,000;161 
however, when Robert submitted the claim to Allstate, the company 
refused to provide coverage.162
The Carlsons’ policy stated that “[Allstate] will pay damages 
for bodily injury . . . which an insured person is legally entitled to 
recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto.”
 
163  The 
question was whether Aaron was an “insured person.”  The only 
policy definition of “insured person” that could have included 
Aaron was “you,”164
 
 155. 749 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2008). 
 which was further defined as “the policyholder 
 156. Id. at 43.  The insurance agent who issued the policy was informed that 
Aaron would be the car’s primary driver.  Id. at 44. 
 157. Id. at 43. 
 158. Id. at 43–44. 
 159. Id. at 43.  There was no discussion between Robert and the agent 
regarding coverage in the situation that Aaron was struck as a pedestrian by an 
uninsured motorist.  Id. at 44. 
 160. Id. at 43. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 44. 
 163. Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 164. “Insured persons” was defined in the policy as “[y]ou and any resident” 
and “[a]ny person while in, on, getting into or out of an insured auto with your 
permission.”  Id.  Aaron did not reside with Robert and did not argue that he was 
“in, on, getting into or out of” the Focus at the time of the accident; thus, he 
could only be covered if he fell within the definition of “you.”  Id. at 44 n.1.  
Because he did not reside with Robert, Aaron also did not qualify as an insured by 
the language of Minnesota’s no-fault statute.  See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43 subdiv. 5 
(2006) (defining “insured” to require that a person “not identified by name as an 
insured . . . resid[e] in the same household with the named insured . . .”). 
23
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named on the Policy Declarations.”165  The policy declarations 
page, however, did not include the word “policyholder;” it 
identified “named insureds” and “drivers.”166
Only one fact was contended.  Robert stated in a deposition 
that his insurance agent told him that his children would be 
covered “the same as I and my wife.”
   
167  Robert’s insurance agent 
claimed that he did not specifically say that.168  The trial court, 
considering Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, took Robert’s 
account as true, but granted the motion nonetheless, holding that 
there was no coverage;169 the court of appeals affirmed.170  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, finding 
no coverage under the terms of the policy.171
B. The Court’s Holding 
 
The Carlsons first argued that, because the declarations page 
did not contain the word “policyholder,” it was reasonable to 
assume that the term included both the “named insureds” and 
“drivers.”172
 
 165. Carlson, 749 N.W.2d at 43 (emphasis added). 
  The court disagreed, explaining that a reasonable 
person would understand “policyholder” to refer only to the owner 
 166. Robert was notified by his insurance agent at the time he obtained the 
policy that Aaron could not be listed as a named insured because he had no 
ownership interest in the car.  Id. at 44. 
 167. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. at 43.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 49.  The supreme court rejected the Carlsons’ argument, not 
examined in the text of this case note, that Minnesota statutory law required 
coverage.  The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act provides that a 
pedestrian injured by an automobile “is entitled to select any one limit of liability 
for any one vehicle afforded by a policy under which the injured person is 
insured.”  MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 subdiv. 3a(5) (2006).  The Carlsons argued that 
the Act mandated coverage for Aaron because he was “insured” under the Allstate 
policy.  See Carlson, 749 N.W.2d at 46.  However, the court dismissed this argument, 
concluding that “the subdivision describes . . . which policy an injured person may 
look to for coverage, rather than describing what coverage each of those policies 
must provide. Under this reading, the meaning of ‘insured’ for purposes of an 
injured pedestrian depends upon the policy rather than the statute.”  Id.  The 
court’s reading of the statute was supported by a previous decision, which held 
that the statute was not intended to broadly define “insured,” but to establish a 
hierarchy by which a person insured by the terms of a policy could select a policy 
for coverage.  See id. at 46-47 (citing Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 
N.W.2d 7, 13 (Minn. 2000)). 
 172. Carlson, 749 N.W.2d at 45–46. 
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of the policy.173  A policy term is ambiguous, it noted, only if it is 
“susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations.”174  Because 
the Carlsons’ interpretation of the policy was not reasonable, 
“policyholder” was held to be unambiguous.175
The Carlsons next argued that, even if the policy was not 
ambiguous, the doctrine of reasonable expectations should be 
applied to provide coverage for Aaron.
 
176
In declining to apply the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations [in Board of Regents], we noted that Atwater 
“presented a unique situation,” suggesting that the 
doctrine was not broadly applicable . . . .  Board of Regents 
limits Atwater, if not to its specific facts, at least to 
circumstances where the exclusion from coverage was 
unreasonably hidden.
  The court clearly 
distanced itself from Atwater, confirming that its decision in Board of 
Regents had all but erased the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
from Minnesota law: 
177
The court expressed concern that the doctrine created 
confusion and could be used to ignore unambiguous contract 
terms
 
178 in order to achieve judicially-preferred outcomes in the 
name of public policy and the policyholder’s expectations.179
 
 173. Id. at 46 (“We conclude that a reasonable person, even one unversed in 
the law or insurance, would understand that ‘policyholder’ referred to the policy’s 
owner.”). 
  To 
 174. Id. at 45 (citing Medica, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 556 N.W.2d 74, 77 
(Minn. 1997)). 
 175. Id.  The only other interpretation considered was Allstate’s: that the 
policyholder is the “named insured.”  Id.  The court noted that this definition 
comported with dictionary definitions of “policyholder.”  See id. (citing BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1497 (2d ed. 1987)). 
 176. Id. at 47. 
 177. Id. at 48–49 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. 
Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 891 n.4 (Minn. 1994)). 
 178. Id. at 48.  Ambiguity was only one factor in the reasonable expectations 
analysis, according to Atwater, not a necessary condition for its application.  See 
Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 
1985).  The majority in Carlson conceded, however, that the supreme court had 
not used the doctrine to award coverage in the absence of ambiguity since that 
case.  Carlson, 479 N.W.2d at 49. (“[I]n no case since Atwater have we used the 
doctrine to provide coverage in contravention of unambiguous policy terms.”).  
Furthermore, the court of appeals had also refused to apply the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations in the absence of ambiguity.  See cases cited supra notes 
142–44.  Thus, the court’s concern seems somewhat unnecessary. 
 179. See Carlson, 749 N.W.2d at 49 (citing Bjorkman, supra note 95, at 39; 
Fischer, supra note 105, at 165). 
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promote coherency in the law and to protect the freedom of 
contract, the court ruled that the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations would thereafter be applicable in only two situations: 
[W]e are unwilling to expand the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations beyond its current use as a tool for resolving 
ambiguity and for correcting extreme situations like that 
in Atwater, where a party’s coverage is significantly 
different from what the party reasonably believes it has 
paid for and where the only notice the party has of that 
difference is in an obscure and unexpected provision.180
The court did not remark upon the question of whether or not 
the policy exclusion denying Aaron coverage resulted in 
“significantly different” coverage than what the Carlsons reasonably 
believed they had.  However, it pointed out that the policy did 
differentiate between “named insureds” and “drivers,” and that the 
Carlsons’ insurance agent had informed Robert that the two were 
treated differently.
 
181  Concluding that to use “the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations to cover such a situation would expand 
Atwater considerably,” the court affirmed the lower judgments 
denying coverage.182
 
 180. Id.  Earlier in the opinion, the court remarked that Board of Regents had 
limited Atwater to its specific facts.  See id.  That remark seems inconsistent with 
Carlson’s holding that the doctrine would apply in cases of ambiguity, given that 
there was no ambiguity in the Atwater policy.  However, the court’s remark was not 
necessary for Carlson’s ultimate holding and can be considered dicta. 
 
 181. Id.  The court did not consider the case’s sole disputed fact at this point: 
whether the Carlsons’ insurance agent did tell Robert that Aaron would be 
insured “the same as I and my wife.”  Id. at 44.  The court indicated earlier that it 
would accept Robert’s account because summary judgment was granted for 
Allstate.  Id. at 44.  Given the procedural posture, it is curious that the court later 
credited the agent’s testimony in reaching its conclusion, rather than Robert’s. 
 182. Id. at 50.  The three-justice dissent argued that the policy was, in fact, 
ambiguous, and that the Carlsons’ reasonable expectations should be honored.  
Id. at 50 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting) (“Both [‘named insured’ and ‘driver’] are 
terms of art in an insurance contract, and neither bears any obvious relationship 
to the term ‘policyholder.’  Therefore, in the mind of an ordinary person with no 
expertise in the law and insurance, the ‘policyholder’ could plausibly include 
[either term].”).  However, the dissent did not discuss the majority’s treatment of 
Atwater, instead citing to the hybrid rule of insurance contract interpretation that 
“[a]mbiguous terms . . . are to be resolved against the insurer and in accordance 
with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”  See id. at 51 (P. Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Widness ex rel. Widness, 635 
N.W.2d 516, 524 (Minn. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CARLSON 
Minnesota jurisprudence has limited the applicability of 
Atwater for over two decades; Carlson continues, and perhaps 
concludes, that process.  Given the rarity of cases involving hidden 
exclusions,183 the doctrine of reasonable expectations remains 
practically viable only when policy terms are ambiguous.184
A. How is Ambiguity in an Insurance Contract to Be Interpreted? 
  The 
Atwater decision is left as a seeming aberration.  However, two 
problems remain, neither of which is resolved by Carlson.   
It remains unclear exactly how ambiguous policy terms will 
actually be interpreted in a given case.  Carlson endorses the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations for the task, but its statement 
on the matter is weak: it refers to the doctrine as “a tool for 
resolving ambiguity.”185  Two conceptual problems arise.  First, the 
court does not sufficiently define that tool.186  Second, the court’s 
statement implies that the doctrine might be used concurrently 
and consistently with other tools, as well.187
First, it is unclear whether the Carlson court was referring to 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations of Atwater or one of the 
doctrine’s later manifestations, especially given the confusion of 
 
 
 183. Since Atwater, no case before the Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected 
policy terms on this ground.  Id. at 49. 
 184. Although cases necessitating application of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations might be rare, the doctrine is nonetheless valuable as a veritable last 
line of defense for consumer rights.  Contra proferentem and other rules of 
construction do not allow unambiguous contract language to be construed in an 
insured’s favor, no matter how onerous (although unconscionability might apply 
in severe cases).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981) 
(“Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such 
assent [to a standardized contract] would not do so if he knew that the writing 
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”).  Thus, 
leaving the doctrine intact as a mechanism for handling those rare cases is 
important for the protection of consumer rights.  This consideration, which 
prompted Keeton to formulate the doctrine and the Atwater court, among others, 
to adopt it, played a role in the Carlson court retaining it, even if in a limited 
fashion.  See id. (describing the doctrine of reasonable expectations as “a tool . . . 
for correcting extreme situations like that in Atwater”).  See also Fett, supra note 88, 
at 1134 (“The reasonable expectations doctrine should be applied only when 
other interpretive and constructive doctrines such as the doctrine of ambiguity do 
not apply and the facts indicate a need for consumer protection.”). 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
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the common law in formulating and applying the reasonable 
expectations analysis.188  On one hand, the Carlson court could be 
referring to the “weak” version of the doctrine, which holds that 
the insured’s reasonable expectations control the interpretation of 
ambiguous policy language.189  On the other hand, it could have 
just as easily had in mind the Rusthoven hybrid of contra proferentem 
limited by the insured’s reasonable expectations, which still 
appears to be good law,190 or some other rule.191
Second, if the court was referring to the “weak” version of the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations, then a contradiction arises 
from the suggestion that it can be used in some cases while another 
rule like that of Rusthoven can be used to interpret ambiguous 
policy language in other cases.
 
192  The doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, “weak” or “strong,” need not result in a pro-insured 
interpretation; it might lead to a pro-insurer outcome if the 
insured’s expectations require such a result.193  For example, the 
doctrine allows a court considering an ambiguous policy to avoid 
awarding coverage to an insured when to do so would be obviously 
contrary to the parties’ intentions.194  In this way, the doctrine 
relieves the strictness of contra proferentem.195
However, that characteristic of the doctrine of reasonable 
  
 
 188. See supra Part II.C. 
 189. See Fischer, supra note 105, at 155. 
 190. For example, the Carlson dissent, having found the policy language 
ambiguous, proceeded to analyze what it thought the proper outcome should have 
been.  It began with what it presumably thought was the correct rule for 
interpreting ambiguous policy terms: they are to be construed against the insurer 
according to the insured’s reasonable expectations.  See Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
749 N.W.2d 41, 50 (Minn. 2008) (P. Anderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Progressive 
Specialty Ins. Co. v. Widness ex rel. Widness, 635 N.W.2d 516, 524 (Minn. 2001)). 
 191. Much of the resulting confusion on this issue comes from the fact that the 
court, in finding that the Carlsons’ policy contained no ambiguous language, had 
no need to specify what standard it would use if it had found ambiguity. 
 192. See Carlson, 749 N.W.2d 41, 49–50. 
 193. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 
(Minn. 1985); see also Stempel, supra note 95, at 204 (“Ironically, the reasonable 
expectations concept in Minnesota today may possess greatest decisional strength 
when used against a policyholder.”). 
 194. See Bjorkman, supra note 95, at 42. 
 195. See Fischer, supra note 105, at 157 (“[The doctrine of reasonable 
expectations] can actually benefit the [insurer] since use of the weak version may 
ameliorate the traditional rule of contra proferentem, which is that ambiguity is 
construed against the drafter, here the [insurer]. If a policyholder would not have 
a reasonable expectation of coverage in any event, then the policy will not be 
construed in the policyholder’s favor by use of a formal rule of construction.”).  
Id. 
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expectations creates the contradiction.  Other analyses, such as 
contra proferentem or the Rusthoven hybrid, strictly disallow the 
possibility of a pro-insurer interpretation of ambiguous policy 
language.196  These analyses require that ambiguous language be 
construed against the insurer197 and differ only as to the extent that 
it should be done.198  The doctrine of reasonable expectations, to 
the contrary, seeks to objectively determine what coverage was 
expected without bias in either direction.199
The Carlson decision leaves open the possibility that different 
rules might be employed to resolve contract ambiguity in different 
cases.
  Although application 
of the doctrine might reach the same result as the other rules, the 
basic premises of the different “tools” are conceptually 
incompatible. 
200
B. How Are an Insured’s Reasonable Expectations to Be Defined? 
  At best, this can only perpetuate the confusion that exists 
in the law of contract interpretation in Minnesota. 
Assuming that the insured’s reasonable expectations are 
relevant and determinative in the interpretation of ambiguous 
policy language, whatever the rule of construction, there is the 
basic problem of identifying what those expectations are.201  Giving 
effect to the insured’s reasonable expectations is meant to provide 
an objective standard for interpreting insurance contracts.202
 
 196. Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 642, 644–45 
(Minn. 1986) (“[T]he policy is ambiguous and, therefore, is to be strictly 
interpreted against the insurer.”) (emphasis added).     
  
 197. Id. 
 198. See id.  Contra proferentem puts no limit on the extent to which a policy may 
be construed against the insurer.  Id.  “The result of such a construction,” 
according to the Rusthoven court, “must not be beyond the reasonable 
expectations of the insured.”  Id. at 645.  See also Fett, supra note 88, at 1127 
(“[T]he [Rusthoven] court expounded a new proposition that the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations is a limitation on the doctrine of [contra proferentem].”). 
 199. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (“In our view, the reasonable-expectations 
doctrine does not automatically mandate either pro-insurer or pro-insured 
results.”). 
 200. See Carlson, 749 N.W.2d 41, 49-50. 
 201. See Fischer, supra note 105, at 161 (noting that the evidence that would 
support an assertion of an average insured’s reasonable expectations is largely 
indefinable). 
 202. Davenport Peters Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 286, 291 (D. 
Mass. 1980) (“The most distinctive feature of the doctrine is that it applies to 
expectations that are objectively reasonable . . . .”); Keeton, supra note 2, at 967 
(“The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries 
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though 
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However, empirical research suggests that insureds do not actually 
form expectations for their coverage.203  The average insured does 
not shop around and misunderstands not only the coverage that 
she purchases, but what options were available to be purchased.204  
Against this backdrop, it becomes difficult for a court to factually 
determine what an insured’s a priori reasonable expectations in any 
given situation might have been.205
As a result, it is left to the court to determine the insured’s 
reasonable expectations itself; lacking factual evidence, the court is 
forced to rely on its own perception of what is fair or just.
 
206  This 
eliminates the objectivity that was the foundation of the doctrine.  
The doctrine can be used as a deus ex machina207 to promote the 
court’s conception of public policy, or to provide a “veil of 
legitimacy”208 in which to cloak the dissolution of the freedom of 
contract.209
Carlson eliminated the possibility of such misuse where 
unambiguous policy language is concerned,
   
210
 
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those 
expectations.”) (emphasis added). 
 but it did not 
address the issue of how the insured’s reasonable expectations are 
to be established when the doctrine is used as a tool to interpret 
 203. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 323 (1998). 
 204. Id.  It might be argued that an insured’s attempt to shop for attractive 
policy terms is hindered by the high costs of understanding complex information, 
and that those costs are created by the insurance companies themselves, justifying 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations.  See Dudi Schwartz, Interpretation and 
Disclosure in Insurance Contracts, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 105, 133 (2008).  
However, Professor Thomas’s research suggests that insured’s exhibit the 
characteristics of a low-involvement consumer, and that if they have any specific 
expectation, it is that the policy terms will exclude coverage for any particular 
claim.  See id. 
 205. See Fischer, supra note 105, at 161. 
 206. See id. at 164. See also Curtis v. Home Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986) (providing a rare example of coverage being denied on the basis of 
evidence showing that the insured’s ex ante expectations were against it).   
 207. Fischer, supra note 105, at 163. 
 208. Bjorkman, supra note 95, at 42. 
 209. See Ware, supra note 87, at 1490 (“[A] court’s refusal to enforce policy 
language imposes duties on the parties to which they did not consent and deprives 
them of rights to which they are entitled.”). 
 210. Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co. 749 N.W.2d 41, 49 (Minn. 2008). Assuming, of 
course, that a court applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations to 
unambiguous policy language is truly faced with a situation where the insured’s 
coverage is “significantly different” than what was expected due to “an obscure 
and unexpected” policy provision.  See id.  
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/10
11. Cody.docx 12/2/2009  4:43 PM 
296 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
ambiguous language.211  The potential use of the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations as a stratagem for injecting the court’s 
subjectivity into policy interpretation was a primary concern of the 
Carlson court.212
 Without guidance on how to objectively identify the insured’s 
reasonable expectations, Minnesota case law remains unclear on 
this matter, as well.   
  Ironically, then, Carlson’s language leaves the 
possibility as open as it ever was. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Minnesota’s law of insurance contract construction has long 
been inconsistent.  Even during the time of contra proferentem, it was 
difficult to predict when and how the court would find ambiguity in 
a policy.  Atwater purported to do away with “arbitrary rules which 
do not reflect real-life situations.”213  However, the treatment of 
Atwater by both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the court of 
appeals simply added confusion to the inconsistency, and that 
confusion was enhanced by the supreme court’s inability to decide 
upon a clear rule in Atwater’s aftermath.214
Carlson provided the court with an opportunity to settle this 
area of law, and it did in at least one respect: Carlson settled 
Atwater’s subordinate status in Minnesota law.
   
215
 
  However, other 
than Allstate’s responsibility to Aaron Carlson, it settled little else 
beyond that status.  Fundamental questions remain unanswered.  
What interpretational analysis should a court use to resolve 
ambiguous policy language?  If the insured’s reasonable 
expectations are to be considered, how are they to be determined?  
These questions, even after Carlson, await further answer by the 
court. 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id.   
 213. Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 
(Minn. 1985). 
 214. See supra Part II.C. 
 215. Carlson, 749 N.W.2d at 49. 
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